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Abstract. High-integrity embedded systems operate in multiple modes, in order 
to ensure system availability in the face of faults. Unanticipated state-dependent 
faults that remain in software after system design and development behave like 
hardware transient faults: they appear, do the damage and disappear. The 
conventional approach used for handling task overruns caused by transient 
faults is to use a single recovery task that implements minimal functionality. 
This approach provides limited availability and should be used as a last resort in 
order to keep the system online. Traditional fault detection approaches are often 
intrusive in that they consume processor resources in order to monitor system 
behavior. This paper presents a novel approach for fault-monitoring by 
leveraging the Ravenscar profile, model-checking and a system-on-chip 
implementation of both the kernel and an execution time monitor. System fault-
tolerance is provided through a hierarchical set of operational modes that are 
based on timing behavior violations of individual tasks within the application. 
The approach is illustrated through a simple case study of a generic navigation 
system.  
Introduction 
Embedded systems are becoming permeating every facet of our daily lives, ranging 
from the control of toasters to managing complex flight control operations. A crucial 
segment of the embedded systems market addresses the needs of high-integrity 
systems, i.e., systems whose incorrect operation leads to significant losses in 
monetary terms, in terms of human lives or a combination thereof. High-integrity 
embedded real-time systems have to address the requirements imposed by the need 
for high-integrity as well as to satisfy the real-time nature of the system. By real-time, 
we mean the need to operate within the temporal constraints on system behavior. 
There are a number of well proven approaches for developing predictable real-time 
systems, in which the correctness of temporal behavior is assured in a systematic 
manner [11, 12]. A good example is fixed priority scheduling, which assumes that the 
system is formed by a fixed-set of tasks that provide system capabilities through 
periodic/aperiodic execution. This approach works extremely well when the system 
operates in a single mode, however, the class of systems, Figure 1., addressed in this 
paper display multi-moded behavior i.e. the system has a set of modes that involve 
overlapping sets of tasks providing different capabilities depending on the current 
state of the system, and the environment in which the system operates.  
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Fig. 1. Embedded Systems Problem Space 
These systems undergo significant verification and validation activities prior to 
fielding. However, there are unanticipated state-dependent faults that remain in 
operational software after system design and development. These faults behave like 
hardware transient faults: they appear, do the damage and disappear [17]. In the 
context of real-time systems, the most visible manifestation of this class of faults is 
tasks missing their deadlines either through overruns or underruns. A multi-moded 
high-integrity real-time embedded system has to have the ability to detect the 
violation of timing bounds, and transition to the appropriate operational mode, while 
retaining predictable behavior and providing continued service. This paper presents a 
novel approach that leverages formal methods, System-on-chip design and the 
Ravenscar profile [2] to provide non-intrusive system level fault-tolerance.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The Technology section discusses 
the three key areas that enable our approach for non-intrusive monitoring, and allow 
mode-transitions to provide continued service when tasks violate their timing bounds; 
the section on Approach provides an overview of the modeling, analysis and 
implementation adopted in this paper; the Gurkh Generic Navigation System section 
illustrates the approach using a simple case study of a navigation system; the 
Conclusions section documents the limitations of the current approach and charts the 
path forward in terms of future work.  
Technology 
Three key technologies have enabled us to reconsider and challenge the conventional 
approach of handling timing overruns of tasks. The first is the Ravenscar Profile [2, 
4], a subset of the Ada 95 tasking model, which allows for analyzable deterministic 
concurrent tasking. The second is the emergence of low-cost system-on-chip 
technologies that contain embedded processors and Field-Programmable Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs). The third is the successful development and use of model-checking tools, 
e.g., UPPAAL [6], to automate the formal verification.  
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The Ravenscar Profile of Ada 95 
In the domain of high-integrity real-time embedded systems, the use of Ada 83 
run-time features, such as the rendezvous mechanism, select statements, and abort 
statement make deterministic analysis of the application infeasible [2].  The non-
determinism and potentially blocking behavior of tasking or run-time calls when these 
features are used makes it impossible to derive an upper bound on execution time, 
which is critical for schedulability analysis. The Ravenscar Profile [2, 4] defines a 
subset of the Ada 95 tasking model to meet the requirements for determinism, 
schedulability analysis, and memory-boundedness associated with high-integrity real-
time embedded systems.  Additionally, the profile enables the creation of a small and 
efficient run-time system that supports task communication and synchronization. The 
Ravenscar Profile mandates the use of a static task set in the system and only allows 
inter-task communication to occur via protected objects.  A static task set implies that 
the system has a fixed number of tasks at all time, hence the tasks cannot be created 
dynamically or terminate. Tasks have a single invocation event, but can have 
potentially unbounded number of invocations. Task invocations can either be time-
triggered (tasks executing in response to a time event, such as delays) or event-
triggered (executing in response to an event external to tasks). Task scheduling is 
carried out in a pre-emptive highest priority first manner. These restrictions imposed 
by the Ravenscar Profile allow systems to be analyzed for both functional and timing 
behavior.  
Xilinx Virtex II Pro Platform 
The Xilinx Virtex II Pro platform [18] contains an embedded PowerPC (PPC) core 
and an FPGA. The complete system architecture is shown in Figure 2. The software 
component of the system is implemented as a set of Ada 95 tasks that run on the PPC. 
A hardware implemented runtime kernel called RavenHaRT provides inter-task 
communication and scheduling services.  
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Fig. 2. System Architecture 
RavenHaRT [16] is a formally verified, deterministic run-time system based on the 
Ravenscar Profile. The kernel specification enables the user to create a custom run-
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time system that can be synthesized onto the FPGA at the end of system design. The 
other critical component is the monitoring chip (MC). The MC contains a set of 
execution timers associated with application tasks, and is synthesized onto the FPGA. 
The MC monitors the timing behavior based on information from RavenHaRT, and 
informs RavenHaRT when a timing violation is detected.  
Model Checking using UPPAAL 
The UPPAAL model-checking toolkit [4, 6] consists of three main parts: a description 
language, a simulator and a model checker. The idea behind the tool is to model a 
system using the graphical user interface and timed automata [1, 8], validate the 
system by simulation, and finally verify the system that it is correct with respect to a 
set of properties. UPPAAL uses a non-deterministic guarded command language to 
describe the system behavior as networks of automata extended with clock and data 
variables. The simulator is a validation tool, which can be used to examine a set of 
possible dynamic executions of the system as part of the design process. The model 
checker uses (directed) state space exploration to cover the dynamic behavior of the 
system and check invariant and bounded-liveness properties  
Approach 
The intuitive principle behind implementing fault-tolerance in a system is to increase 
design robustness by adding redundant resources and the mechanisms necessary to 
make use of them when needed [10]. Fault-tolerance mechanisms can be broadly 
partitioned into fault detection and fault handling. Fault detection mechanisms 
identify the occurrence of the fault and determine when to initiate/trigger a recovery 
action. The fault handling mechanisms act on the signal provided by the fault 
detection mechanism to protect the system either by reconfiguration of resources or 
by transitioning to a safe mode.  
 
Conventionally high-integrity real-time embedded systems are built using cyclic 
schedulers [4]. A task exceeding its budgeted execution time over a cyclic schedule 
can be easily detected, and necessary corrective action can be taken. This is carried 
out by checking if the current action was completed by the task when a minor cycle 
interrupt occurs. If the action has not been completed, then it is assumed that a task 
has overrun its budgeted time, and the necessary fault-handling mechanism is 
adopted. Preemptive multi-tasking schedulers make system design a lot simpler 
through the use of concurrency, but there are no comparable approaches for detecting 
and handling execution time overruns [7]. Classical overrun management schemes 
that use techniques such as dynamic priorities and aborts are not Ravenscar 
compliant. Work carried out by de la Puente and Zamorano proposes a Ravenscar 
compliant scheme that allows a supervisory task to detect overruns and preempt the 
faulty task [5]. Similar work carried out by Harbour et.al, [7], proposes an execution 
time clock library that can be used to monitor timing behavior of the executing 
application. Both approaches are constrained by the fact that the monitor itself alters 
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the timing behavior of the total system. The approach proposed in this paper is to 
carry out non-intrusive fault detection by externally monitoring of execution time 
behavior of the application software running on the PPC by using a set of hardware 
implemented execution timers; and carry out fault handling though mode changes of 
the application, as shown in Figure 3.  
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Fig. 3. Overarching Approach for Fault Detection and Handling 
Fault Detection 
The timing bounds of each of the application tasks are specified in terms of the worst 
case execution time (WCET) and the best case execution time (BCET). These bounds 
are implemented as timers in hardware, and the set of timers associated with the 
application is referred to as the Monitoring Chip (MC). The MC is implemented on 
the FPGA along with RavenHaRT as shown in Figure 4.  
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Fig. 4. Fault-Detection Using MC 
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 When a timing bound violation is detected, MC informs RavenHaRT through an 
interrupt mechanism. The interrupt raised by MC is processed by RavenHaRT, which 
then activates the MC_Int_Hdlr task in order to switch the application’s mode of 
operation. The timers within the MC are selected based on the application’s mode of 
operation, and the timing bound violated (BCET/WCET). The application tasks on the 
PPC and the execution timers running in the MC are synchronized by RavenHaRT to 
ensure that there are no false alarms raised by the MC.  
Mode Change 
Real and Crespo [14] identify the four requirements for a successful mode change as 
schedulability, periodicity, promptness and consistency. Each requirement is 
addressed in the context of the proposed approach: 
 
• Schedulability - In the uniprocessor environment provided by the Xilinx 
Virtex II Pro, at most one task violating its deadline is detected at any given 
time hence the mode switch is restricted to changing the control flow of a 
single task. All other tasks continue to operate in the previous mode. Hence 
the only task whose deadline changes is the aberrant task. The timing 
behavior of the application tasks are modeled in UPPAAL for the required 
operational modes and the schedulability is verified prior to system 
implementation. 
 
• Periodicity –The periodicity requirement is satisfied by the RavenHaRT 
scheduler, which ensures the activation of periodic tasks. 
 
• Promptness – The mode change handler receives the identity of the aberrant 
task, and the bound (BCET/WCET) that it violated. The mode change is 
carried out based on the priority of the task, and the impact on dependent 
tasks.  
 
• Consistency – The use of protected objects for inter-task communication 
ensures that shared resources are used consistently.   
 
Each application task follows the same template as shown in Figure 5. The first 
instruction that the task executes within the loop is a call to the Check_Mode function 
to read the MODE protected variable present in the SWITCH protected object. This 
MODE variable determines the control flow of the application task. The different 
paths through the program converge before the task delays itself or loops. The 
Change_Mode procedure of the SWITCH protected object is the only way to change 
the value of MODE, and is accessed by the MC_Int_Hdlr task to issue a mode change 
instruction. The MC has a state machine, which determines which set of timers to use 
in the new operating mode based on the current mode of operation and the bound that 
was violated. The mode switching mechanism is verified by model-checking the 
operational modes in UPPAAL to ensure that tasks meet their deadlines under degraded 
operations.  
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task body App_Task_x is
operation_mode : Mode_Type
-- other declarations
begin 
loop 
-- Do something 
Operational_Mode := Switch.Check_Mode;
case Operational_Mode is
when   Nominal=> --take one path;
null;
when Mode_1 =>-- take another path
null;
-- do other paths if needed
end case;
--requisite delay statement
end loop;
end App_Task_x; 
 
Fig. 5. Fault-Detection Using MC 
Switchback capability to nominal mode of operation uses the same functional pieces 
that operate the switch to the different operating modes. The task violating its bounds 
continues to run, and the rest of the system is configured to behave as if the faulty 
task does not exist; i.e., the faulty task is quarantined and the system does not rely on 
its services. The monitoring chip inspects the timing behavior of the quarantined task. 
If it runs and communicates with POs nominally then its timing should correspond to 
the nominal timing. One simple means of quarantining and monitoring task behavior 
is to modify the timing behavior such that the best case execution time of the 
quarantined task exceeds the worst case execution time when the task runs nominally, 
i.e., the MC sets the BCET’ of the task equal to WCET (where the ’ symbol indicates 
quarantined task). The MC detects the restoration of normal services if BCET’ is now 
violated.  
Gurkh Generic Navigation System 
The Gurkh Generic Navigation System (GGNS) models the core real-time software 
architecture of a generic guidance and navigation system. The model provides enough 
functional complexity to be challenging and is small enough for the MC to be 
synthesized on the FPGA along with the hardware implemented run-time kernel. The 
GGNS model computes navigation information, such as position, velocity and 
acceleration, based on two sensors: the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and the 
Global Positioning System (GPS). GPS data enters the system in the form of 
messages that are processed to yield Line-Of-Sight (LOS) data, which is fed into a 
Kalman Filter (KF). The KF estimates present and future navigation information and 
corrects these estimates according to incoming LOS navigation data. These estimates 
are fed to a high rate Sequencer task. The Sequencer acts as the central node, 
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gathering all inputs and performs the actual navigation computations. The Sequencer 
can also request an immediate estimate from the KF if the data is not provided earlier. 
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Fig. 6. Task Model of GGNS 
GGNS Task Model 
The GGNS task model is shown in Figure 6. The system consists of five tasks, three 
internal to GGNS and two external trigger tasks that simulate input data streams. The 
High_Rate_Nav task, acts as the overall sequencer, which provides navigation data to 
the external world. The Low_Rate_Nav task acts as the Kalman filter, carrying out 
estimation of navigation information by integrating information from both the GPS 
and IMU. The GPS_RCV task is an event triggered task that gathers LOS data from 
External_Trigger_Task_1.  
 
The High_Rate_Nav task collects IMU data, KF data, and raises a flag if KF data is 
not available fast enough. The Low_Rate_Nav task has three activities: collect LOS 
data, send KF data, and responds to the flag raised by the High_Rate_Nav task by 
outputting KF data as soon as it becomes runnable. The GPS_Receive task is 
triggered by the arrival of a GPS message and has two activities: collect the GPS 
message, and send LOS data. 
 
The data communications between these three main tasks are implemented with 
protected objects (POs). Three of the POs are the buffers containing LOS data, KF 
navigation data, and IMU data. The Urgent PO implements the signaling capability 
that needs to exist between the High_Rate_Nav and the Low_Rate_Nav Tasks. Event 
PO implements the event triggering capability of the GPS Receive Task. The 
External_Trigger_Task_1 simulates incoming GPS messages and interacts only with 
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Event PO. External_Trigger_Task_2 simulates incoming IMU data and interacts only 
with the IMU data buffer. 
Monitoring and Mode Switching 
Operational modes are organized hierarchically based on timing behavior violations 
of the three tasks: High_Rate_Nav, Low_Rate_Nav and GPS_Receive. There are 
eight possible combinations of task’s violating their deadlines, as shown in Figure 7.  
The hierarchical organization serves to illustrate the different classes of degraded 
service in decreasing order of the quality of navigation information generated. The 
modes of operation were determined through interaction with domain experts to 
ensure that the requisite level of service was maintained. It must be noted that a mode 
change can only be made along the path from the nominal mode of operation to 
complete violation of all timing bounds.  
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GPS LO HI 
LOW & GPS HI & GPS HI & LO
A B C
D
 
 
Fig. 7. GGNS Operational Modes 
The High_Rate_Nav (HI) task receives input from both the Low_Rate_Nav task 
(LO), as well as the External_Trigger_Task_2 (which provides inertial measurement 
data. If the GPS_RCV task (GPS), or the LO violates their timing bounds, HI will not 
have access to reliable GPS information. The designer may however choose to 
completely ignore GPS data, switch to Mode A – which is the approach adopted in 
the implementation. If the system designer works under the assumption that some raw 
information is more useful than no information, the system bypasses LO temporarily 
and transitions to Mode B. The system switches to Mode C if HI violates its execution 
time bound while waiting for IMU data. If both HI and LO violate their deadlines, or 
both HI and GPS violate their deadlines, then it is essential to ensure that HI can 
fulfill its essential responsibilities without reliable GPS information, which yields the 
10      Kristina Lundqvist, Jayakanth Srinivasan, Sébastien Gorelov 
operating mode D. In the case in which all tasks violate their bounds, the system 
transitions into safety mode. The summary of the system fault modes is presented in 
Table 1.  
 
Operating Mode High_Rate_Nav Low_Rate_Nav GPS_Receive_Task 
A Degraded GPS Mode Holding Error States Quarantined 
 
B Degraded LOS Mode Quarantined Nominal 
 
C Basic Mode and 
Quarantined 
Nominal Nominal 
D Basic IMU Mode 
Only 
Quarantined Quarantined 
E Survival Survival Survival 
 
Table 1. GGNS Modes of Operation 
Conclusions 
The Gurkh Generic Navigation System is used as a proof-of-concept demonstrator for 
monitoring the timing behavior of a system with multiple operating modes. The faults 
are detected based on violation of expected timing behavior, and degraded system 
performance is guaranteed by modeling system behavior in the presence of faults and 
formally verifying that the degraded system behavior is deterministic. The current 
system model and implementation assumes a static set of possible configurations of 
the system operation in the presence of faults. The operational mode is selected, and 
the mode transition is predetermined at system implementation time. It must be noted 
that the approach is currently limited to handling violations of timing behavior that 
are caused by non-replicable transient faults. This assumption is made to address the 
limited computational resources available for advanced fault-detection algorithms at 
the subsystem level. The mode change protocol used is based on the modifying the 
control flow of tasks that violate their deadlines, and thereby modifying their timing 
behavior independent of unaffected tasks. The analysis of mode change timing 
behavior is carried out offline, to ensure schedulability. 
 
An alternative approach is to allow an external system master to determine the 
subsystem transition mode. This will provide the system the ability to reconfigure 
itself based on the complete system state (as opposed to the state of just the 
component such as GGNS). For example, the avionics system may be able to 
reconfigure position information based on an alternative sensor such as the radar 
subsystem or the star tracker, in which case the system may choose to transition to the 
suboptimal operational mode. Work is currently underway to provide reconfiguration 
support by using dual operating system: RavenHaRT for regular operation and a 
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reconfiguration OS (implemented as an application task), which will determine how 
the application software running on the PowerPC changes mode, and which 
monitoring model is used for configuring the MC. Determining the operating mode 
externally introduces significant challenges in terms of scheduling the mode change, 
as the subsystem cannot be idle until the mode change request comes through. The 
system master has to have visibility in terms of affected and unaffected tasks in any 
given mode, in order to make an informed mode change request.  
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